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Abstract: The past decade has witnessed a sudden interest in aesthetics among
neuroscientists and philosophers of perception, whose respective approaches are fo-
cused on measuring brain activity given artworks and grasping how human beings
perceive artworks. In this paper, I argue that despite its non-empirical approach,
aesthetics matters more than empiricists readily admit. For several centuries, aes-
thetics has addressed how human beings navigate wordless artworks. It is thus
particularly well-suited for making sense of our wordless world, whose rich con-
tents may be felt, though not perceived. It is unlikely that such empirical studies
could help us understand: the imagination’s role in making sense of unfamiliar
experiences, how human beings spontaneously devise concepts needed for percep-
tion to occur, or the roles played by perplexing, idiosyncratic, or ineffable artworks
in sustaining our interest over centuries. That we value artworks for generating
meaning, provoking imaginations or inspiring thoughts strikes me as rather extra-
perceptual.
I. OUR WORDLESS WORLD
For too long, philosophers have suggested that perception conforms to the ‘lin-
guistic turn’, made famous by Richard Rorty’s 1967 anthology of the same
name. We routinely presume that experiences, knowledge, desires, beliefs,
and even actions are readily expressible as propositions. Of course, philoso-
phers as varied as Gilbert Ryle, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Christopher Pea-
cocke have doubted that experience is so easily conceptualized. I sometimes
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worry that the tendency to reclassify philosophical doubt as healthy skepti-
cism or thought experiments, neutralizes otherwise outré positions. For all
practical purposes, aesthetics remains the singular philosophical field where
language doesn’t occupy centre court. For this reason, aesthetics matters
more than today’s “realists”, whether philosophers of perception or object-
oriented ontologists, who seek evidence for their claims, readily admit.
Whether wordsmiths by nature or loquacious logicians by training, philoso-
phers have seemed loath to acknowledge and slow to develop strategies for
confronting our less obvious, but no less significant wordless world. Of course,
aestheticians do have words and we happily employ them, but our terrain con-
cerns strategies for grasping our wordless world, what Martin Heidegger once
distinguished as earth, given its seclusion as compared to world. He consid-
ered earth out of reach, since it is not yet conceptualized and therefore beyond
perception, yet our worldless world is always present right where we are, not
there, but in the here and now. Our wordless world is present in those art-
works we consider perplexing, idiosyncratic, or ineffable. Strangely, those are
often the ones that draw our attention, precisely because we lack the tools
to understand them. Aestheticians may be best-suited to develop tools such
as nonpropositional epistemology that could enable all philosophers to better
appreciate and navigate more of our wordless world.
At this point, one might respond that it is phenomenology and not aes-
thetics that grants us access to our wordless world. And I would not dis-
agree, save for the fact that so much of our wordless world goes ignored by
all but a handful of university scientists, amateur naturalists, and indigenous
farmers, whose worlds are not dominated by manmade features. Even scien-
tists who recognize world’s wordless component typically converse in terms
of theories, hypotheses, and describable outcomes. Luckily for aesthetics,
the arts prove more popular than science, granting aesthetics its role to phi-
losophize about how it is possible to make sense of wordless episodes like
symphonies, paintings, installation art, sculpture, architecture, decoration,
tools, and more recently, the natural environment. And of course, aesthet-
icians also tackle wordy episodes like opera, poetry, literature, theatre, and
film, which routinely engender wordless imagery. Aestheticians may bandy
about concrete terms like taste, beauty/ugly, aesthetic experience, aesthetic
properties, aesthetic attitudes, aesthetical judgements, intentionality, and
aesthetic/nonaesthetic concepts, but they do so, mostly to capture the extra-
perceptual content that art experiences prompt, such as thoughts, emotions,
and memories. Our wordless world no doubt harbours nonconceptual content,
which somehow gains entry into people’s memory banks, even as it eschews
perception.
By now, it may have crossed your mind that any talk of a wordless world is
an oxymoron, like military intelligence, business ethics, or freedom fighters.
For philosophers who tie world to the totality of facts (following Wittgen-
stein), world itself is philosophical code for worded. Already cognized, world
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is not just describable, but it is knowable in light of constitutive conceptual
schemes. Recall Ludwig Wittgenstein’s 1922 dictum, ‘The world is everything
that is the case’, that is, propositional knowledge. This is no place to rehearse
the philosophical history of world, let alone world itself. Suffice it to say that
Heidegger gave philosophers (whether of mind, perception, or language) an
easy way out when he differentiated world and earth, since this distinction
makes it possible to focus on world at the expense of earth.
Those philosophers who focus on our worded world tend to reject affor-
dances in favour of representations (fully cognized upon perception), thus
shaping our world as recognizable, which is a rather untenable position given
recognition’s dependence on prior categories. For them, world is already
wordy, and whatever dodges identification unproblematically remains earth.
By contrast, aestheticians acknowledge the difficulties surrounding apprehen-
sion and strive to understand how/why we appreciate artworks whose aspects
elude detection, precisely because we cannot categorize them. Recently, aes-
theticians have been exploring roles played by literary genres, art movements
and musical forms, which not only facilitate artworks’ appropriate apprecia-
tion, but their eventual development enables audiences to notice more aspects.
Absent particular interpretative frames, we miss a lot of details. Following
the development of useful frames, content that would otherwise remain inac-
cessible now seems self-evident.
What happens when what we dismiss as merely felt, and therefore un-
knowable, is readily perceived and valued by others, or remembered by many
more? What if we presume that what we consider merely felt must already
be comprehensible to others, because it is perceptible, yet remains unintelligi-
ble? Crazier still, what if world is not entirely conceptualized, even though we
have been taught that it is? Should we still go about our philosophical work
presuming that we perceive only that which is cognized, never once doubting
our foundational beliefs?
II. PERFORMANCE, IMAGINATION, AND
EXTRA-PERCEPTUAL CONTENT
In the course of their philosophical work, aestheticians tend to upend the tri-
umvirate of perception, cognition, and world. Artworks are part of our world,
yet they routinely defy cognition and sometimes upend our perceptual facul-
ties by overloading our senses. Even when we think we easily perceived some
artwork, it may take decades before it is partly, let alone fully, understood. In
fact, artworks are valued more for their extra-perceptual content; their pow-
ers to generate meaning, provoke imaginations, or inspire thoughts. Great
artworks not only unfold over time, but they invoke the help of thousands of
spectators who continue working on them every time they discuss some aes-
thetic experience or try to unpack its meaning. Artworks repeatedly engage
people across the ages, precisely because they confound cognition. Were one
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to perceive artworks the way one perceives the identifiable contents of one’s
own closet or filing cabinet, they would not hold our interest. Moreover, each
new performance of an artwork offers different cognitive engagements as each
artistic director reinterprets the artwork, presenting it in a different light for
changing audiences.
Because artworks are the work of intelligent, well-educated creatives, in-
tentionalists suspect that every detail has been worked out in advance. The
view that artists (or artistic directors) anticipate audience responses, and thus
build reception into their schemes, has recently gained traction from neuro-
aestheticians and cognitive scientists whose research can pinpoint why/how
artworks manipulate viewers. Despite such fascinating research, which al-
ways makes it seem as though artists are in full control of all of their ideas,
decisions, actions, and talent, interviews with artists (even poets and singer-
song writers) reveal nearly the opposite. Artists regularly explain that they
originally did this (wrote those words, made that film or produced that in-
stallation) for some particular reason, only to later realize that their work has
since revealed totally different interests, motivations, or goals; leaving original
intentions to provide reasons, though not meaning. Yes, cognitive scientists
and philosophers of perception may be able to prove how particular details
lure human attention, predict which artworks human beings will find attrac-
tive, or explain why unfamiliar artworks seem so distasteful, but their realm
remains the recognizable, which is concept-dependent. They cannot test or
explain why human beings are drawn to the mysterious and incomprehensible.
Since neuro-aesthetic research tends to track attention, which depends on
object recognition, and identify brain activity in particular zones, I doubt
laboratory research can detect, let alone measure and test for the impact
of nonconceptual content, which lacks the requisite referent for recognition.
Similarly, it cannot evaluate the overwhelming extra-perceptual content gen-
erated by one’s imaginative thoughts and peer discussions following one’s
experiencing some performance. And it may very well be that nonconceptual
content as opposed to perception, does most of the work, despite its appar-
ent worldly absence. I write ‘does most of the work’, because perhaps our
enduring relationships with artworks depend less on what we initially per-
ceive, and more on what we don’t understand, requiring artworks to require
extra-perceptual thoughts to fill in the gap. Moreover, viewers may be lured
to those special spots on images that cognitive scientists are eager to iden-
tify, specifically because they are primarily searching for clues to the work’s
meaning. If one accepts Arthur Danto’s case of nine indiscernible red squares,
for which perceptually-identical paintings have different contents, one under-
stands that meaning and perception need not be strictly correlated. A more
useful triumvirate enjoins performance, imagination, and extra-perceptual
content. Perception matters for sure, but it is primarily an entry vehicle,
leaving the difficult, interpretative work to occur much later, often in the
artwork’s absence.
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In what follows, I review a recent turn of events that is rapidly reshaping
philosophers’ attitudes towards aesthetic experiences, though in a manner
that further divides us from our wordless world. Not only have cognitive
scientists and philosophers of mind entered the fray, but realism’s resurgence,
coupled with a secondary goal to extrapolate mind-independent experiences,
risk to displace our wordless world all the more.
III. TWO SURPRISE INCURSIONS
Since the millennium, contemporary aesthetics has witnessed two unexpected
incursions. One intriguing development concerns philosophers of mind’s sud-
den fascination with aesthetics, while the other involves cognitive scientists’
increasingly measuring aesthetic responses. Both fields’ sudden interests in
aesthetics have caught aestheticians off guard, precisely because they are
heirs to logical positivism’s empirical imprimatur. Nearly a century ago, logi-
cal positivists (also known as the Vienna Circle) disparaged aesthetics, along
with ethics and religion, since they deemed such fields ‘meaningless nonsense’,
given their unverifiability. Even Wittgenstein, whose later Philosophical In-
vestigations explores the kind of ambiguity the arts offer, initially described
ethics, which is “inexpressible”, and aesthetics as “one” in his Tractatus-
Logico Philosophicus (1922). Despite logical positivists’ attempts to discredit
aesthetics, it survived, and especially thrives in countries where philosophers
who do aesthetics manage to reach vast audiences, given the broad inter-
est in the arts. It may thus seem odd that philosophers and scientists who
once dismissed aesthetics as unverifiable are suddenly eager to participate
in its debates. This unforeseen appreciation of aesthetics can be explained
by the recent availability of measurable tools like fMRI (functional magnetic
resonance imaging), PET (Positron emission tomography), and EEG (Elec-
troencephalography). And what better way to understand human brains than
to measure their reactions to pictures of art, film-clips, sound clips, smells,
or some combination thereof. As a result, those philosophers, and even scien-
tists, who once dismissed aesthetics as too unscientific, are now keen to make
their mark in this field by demonstrating a correlation between aesthetic ap-
preciation (in terms of recognition) and brain activity. To some, their claims
to evidence frame aesthetics as merely speculative.
During the nineties, vision scientist Semir Zeki (University College Lon-
don) coined the term neuroaesthetics to refer to a ‘broad range of recent
research in the cognitive neuroscience of visual aesthetics’.1 In 2007, aestheti-
cian William Seeley summarized neuroaesthetics as seeking to explain how
artworks function as either perceptual or aesthetic stimuli, while attempting
to ground experiences in biological explanations.2 After analyzing neuroaes-
thetics’ claims, he concluded that ‘[e]xplanations of how artworks function
generate artistically salient perceptual effects [that] can help clarify concep-
tual issues and resolve debates among competing theories in philosophical
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aesthetics. But, there is no reason to expect that these sorts of explana-
tions will form a coherent unified theory that generalizes to even a subset of
artworks or aesthetic practices.’3
Neuroaesthetics seems primed to describe a causal relationship between
artworks and spectators, but what happens if spectator responses only seem
to have been caused by the artwork. For example, people often respond,
“This does nothing for me”, which isn’t all that surprising since this response
is predicated on a view that objects work on spectators, who need not exert
any extra effort of their own. What was once described as spiritual art may
rather have been empty vessels fulfilling spectators’ fleeting interests
In light of Zeki’s two books (Inner Vision: An Exploration of Art and
the Brain [1999] and Splendors and Misery of the Brain: Love, Creativity
and the Quest for Happiness [2009]) detailing his discoveries regarding the
human brain on art, scores of university biology departments have built sim-
ilar labs across the globe to test vision science, vision & cognition, vision &
perception, neurobiology, etc. Neuroscience labs testing for perceptual and
aesthetic effects have indeed compiled reams of data concerning the relation-
ship between film shots and directed attention or the relationship between
imagery and human emotion, and they routinely capture various brain zones
heating up in light of controlled aesthetic situations. Few aestheticians tire of
hearing neuro-scientists detail their exciting discoveries. Only problem is, we
now have body-in-tube data for people not actually having aesthetic experi-
ences, no different than philosophy of mind’s earlier brain-in-the-vat theories.
Respondents are rather lying in machines looking at pictures or watching
film clips with fMRI censors attached to their scalps. Even if we foretell a
future where such brain scans occur while people experience films in cinemas
or installation art in art museums, we still have the same problem whereby
perception depends on prior concepts, yet avant-garde art tends to produce
objects that defy easy categorization.
Such abridged versions of aesthetic experience reduce engaging multiple
objects with others in select environments (church, museum, theatre, or sculp-
ture park) to image scanning. And they reduce experiences that entail scenes
with vast amounts of detail to brain activity whose signal strength (so-called
hot zones) primarily indicate familiarity and recognition. The same goes for
experiencing films on giant screens in packed sensoround theatres. Since labs
are well-equipped to measure human brains’ pleasure centres and emotional
responses, data gathering remains an incessant pursuit.
Trouble is, some neuroscientists are beginning to doubt the ease with
which neuroscience research can detect beauty’s presence, let alone its uni-
versality. Contra their peers, Bevil Conway and Alexander Rehding are espe-
cially suspicious about statements like: ‘All works that appear beautiful to a
subject have a single brain-based characteristic, which is that they have as a
correlate of experiencing them a change in strength of [fMRI] activity within
the mOFC [medial orbitofrontal cortex].’4 To counter such bold positions,
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they add: ‘[A] discovery that every person’s experience of beauty (however
vaguely defined) correlates with activity within a specific brain region would
be surprising, since it would seem more likely that a complex reaction (beau-
tiful!) would hinge not on the absolute level of activity within a single brain
centre but rather on the pattern of activity across many distributed brain
regions, specifically those responsible for perception, reward, decision mak-
ing, and emotion. Indeed, a broader reading of the literature reveals that the
mOFC is not uniquely associated with experiences of beauty and may be nei-
ther necessary nor sufficient for these experiences. The mOFC appears to be
part of a large network of brain regions that subserves all value judgments.’5
Given this research frenzy, I would encourage aestheticians to jjoin in, either
by collaborating directly with those neuroscientists regularly funneling data
to philosophers of mind or by collecting data in situ from audience mem-
bers attending art events. Moreover, by emphasizing the extra-perceptual,
aestheticians may even inspire neuroscientists to discover ways to detect peo-
ple’s absorption of nonconceptual content, if this happens somehow.
While scientists are rapidly trying to figure out how particular artworks
manipulate, seduce, or direct viewer attention, none has attempted to go from
spectator to artwork, which would require understanding: the imagination’s
role in making sense of unfamiliar experiences, how human beings sponta-
neously devise concepts needed for perception to occur, or the relationship
between venue (including the milieu, environment, and building) and audi-
ence experience. These points, which I consider ‘extra-perceptual’, account
for the fact that much of what happens when we experience artworks occurs
later, and for reasons that may not be directly triggered by perception. Since
art experiences often expose people to unfamiliar imagery, measuring peo-
ple’s responses to either pictures or artworks is limited to what they perceive,
and fails to measure the long-term impact of engaging mysterious contents.
That said, aesthetic experiences are not limited to concrete events. Aesthetic
experiences such as book reading, story telling, or pondering missing or de-
stroyed artworks, occur in the imagination. Consider that Marcel Duchamp’s
Bicycle Wheel was imperceptible from 1917 to 1950, yet people could discuss
its significance despite its being lost. In the seminal text Art as Experience
(1934), John Dewey bemoans the one-sided idea of the nature of perception’,
whereby the ‘elements of seeking and of thinking are subordinated to the per-
fecting of the process of perception itself ...resulting in a thoroughly anaeamic
[sic] conception of art’.6 No longer constrained by the limits of perception, we
can develop what James Shelley calls non-perceptual aesthetic properties (or
features) to demonstrate the necessity of extra-perceptual components.7
Despite Dewey’s concerns regarding exclusively perceptual approaches,
philosophers of mind, historically constrained to theoretical debates, have
recently launched the sub-area known as philosophy of perception. And what
easier way to prove their theories than to tie their philosophical debates to the
reams of data recently gleaned from measuring brain responses to artworks.
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Given aesthetics’ focus on aesthetic experiences, it’s not surprising that many
philosophers of perception are convinced that their work can make a vital
contribution to aesthetics. Dozens of notable philosophers of mind have either
published or have books forthcoming on this topic.8
IV. MARKING SPACE FOR THE EXTRA-PERCEPTUAL
Although not all philosophers of perception rely on neuroaesthetic data, all
are focused on perception, which as I’ve repeatedly noted is hardly the central
feature of aesthetic experience. I imagine that most art lovers rank meaning
and thought-provocation higher than perception. Audiences may earnestly
perceive all that there is to see, hear and smell, but remain entirely unmoved.
Finally, what makes an experience aesthetic is its capacity to provoke reflec-
tion, which again is extra-perceptual.
No doubt, perception is the vehicle that enables human beings to gather
information about their world, but what people readily perceive is usually
linked to what they already know. To recognize chair or forest imagery re-
quires access to chair and forest concepts. By contrast, avant-garde art is
well-known for presenting information whose relevant concepts seem out of
reach, yet human beings eventually find such works meaningful. What is
this process? How do human beings respond when artworks, whether vi-
sual artworks, scores, or scripts, are presented in unfamiliar manners (un-
usual exhibitions, new arrangements, or bizarre interpretations)? Aesthet-
icians routinely work on these kinds of philosophical problems, which remain
extra-perceptual. One’s perception of the actual artwork (the object, score or
script) doesn’t change, yet its changed context can produce entirely different
responses. Imagine an arranged score whose notes appear identical, yet its
performance sounds entirely unfamiliar (Beaudoin and Moore9). Consider
Baz Luhrman’s Romeo & Juliet (1996), which employs Shakespeare’s script
to unrecognizable ends.
There is one last hitch, which is a huge problem for both scientists and
philosophers of mind. Neither field admits to or knows how to account for
nonconceptual content, which bodies absorb even if they don’t perceive it,
theoretically speaking. For philosophers of mind, perceptions are cognized.
They are not just sense-data blobs, but are perceived in light of some ref-
erent, or prior concept. Aesthetic experiences like Richard Wagner’s Ring
Cycle purposely overwhelm the senses, forcing audience members to decide
whether to attend to set design, story line, music, acting, lyrics, singing, char-
acter development, costume design, or some combination thereof. I would
argue that with such rich experiences, the vast majority of what one absorbs
is nonconceptual content, which somehow gets recorded as memory. Even
if nonconceptual content goes unnoticed because it isn’t immediately recog-
nizable, the body somehow stores access to it, which later aesthetic encoun-
ters trigger. Conceptualizing this information take years and lots of outside
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work. Nature walks or unfamiliar experiences similarly overwhelm our senses.
Phone apps like Shazam, whose computers identify birds by recognizing bird
sounds recorded on phones, effectively conceptualize nonconceptual content,
when they tie inscrutable whistles to suspected species. Like Shazam, the
human brain must ratiocinate through all the possible referents that could
conceptualize the experience. Unlike Shazam, human beings sometimes have
to devise novel concepts, such as genres, frames, categories, or movements
to conceptualize aesthetic experience. Even if all nonconceptual content is
simply sense-data split from its referent, philosophy of perception, like its
scientific partner neuroaesthetics, remains crippled by its singular obsession
with measurable perceptual effects on viewers. By contrast, aestheticians
since Immanuel Kant’s Third Critique, have marveled at the way human be-
ings respond to artworks, absent guiding concepts. Not only do philosophers
of perception ignore nonconceptual content, but their emphasizing percep-
tion makes the same mistake as neuroscientists, who tie causality to concept-
dependent recognition, rather than trying to grasp how subjects eventually
experience artworks for which they lack concepts.
The recent incursion by scientists and philosophers of mind signals a
boon for aesthetics, largely because aesthetics is finally poised to demon-
strate its strengths, which philosophers have tended to underestimate. As
already noted, research focused exclusively on perception turns up few sur-
prises, yet such evidentiary approaches often overshadow aesthetics’ far more
original claims. It should also be noted that none of these more evidentiary
practices has produced information that runs counter-intuitive or disproves
claims made by aestheticians for centuries. These newer fields usually pro-
duce results that seem so basic that they can play only ancillary roles, as
footnotes to ongoing debates. Still, the non-evidentiary way that aesthetics
is practiced has led some to presume that its claims are speculative, as com-
pared to scientifically-tested research. To some, this diminishes aesthetics’
authority. To others, it vindicates our wordless world.
suespaid@gmail.com
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Perception of Music”, 2009), Mark Rollins
(The Strategic Eye: Perception and Picto-
rial Art, forthcoming), Jesse Prinz (Works
189
Aesthetics is ‘The Philosophy of Our Wordless World’
of Wonder: The Experience, Evaluation,
and Origin of Art, forthcoming), Su-
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